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Abstract: South Africa is an emerging power with fairly strong democratic institutions that were crafted during the 
transition from minority to majority rule twenty years ago. How has South Africa used its position and power to promote 
democracy in Africa? Against the backdrop of debates on democracy promotion by emerging powers, this article probes 
attempts by successive post-apartheid governments to promote democracy in Africa. We argue that although democracy 
promotion featured prominently in South Africa’s policy toward Africa in the immediate post-apartheid period under Nelson 
Mandela, the administrations of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma faltered in advancing democratic norms. This is largely 
because South Africa has confronted pressures to maximize pragmatic national interests, which have compromised a 
democratic ethos in a continental environment where these values have yet to find steady footing.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
For the past 20 years, the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance in Africa has 
featured in South Africa’s foreign policy. Since the successful transition from minority to majority rule 
benefitted from global pressures for democratization and human rights, post-apartheid governments 
have grappled with fostering democracy in Africa to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity. In 
principle, successive administrations have tried to pursue democratic governance in their African 
engagements, but there have been tremendous obstacles to realizing these principles. These difficulties 
have reflected competing priorities in South Africa’s foreign policy and differences in the styles and 
personalities of the leaders in power. The ability of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to 
advance democracy in Africa has been hampered largely by its enduring liberation ethos, policy divisions 
about the value of these efforts, and long-standing alliance commitments in Africa.  
        This article probes the experiences of Nelson Mandela (1994-1999), Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) and 
Jacob Zuma (2009-present) in democracy promotion in Africa in the face of domestic constraints and 
global expectations. Through a review of government policy documents and academic analyses of South 
African foreign policy, we argue that although the Mandela Administration set the moral tone of infusing 
democratic values in its international affairs, this short-lived period was succeeded by administrations 
that have focused on pragmatic objectives with tenuous links to democratic objectives. Overall, despite 
heightened expectations about its democratic transition, South Africa has accumulated a disappointing 
record on democracy promotion because its leaders have prevaricated on democracy building and 
squandered the opportunity to lead on democratic values.  
        In the first section, we place South Africa’s faltering democracy promotion efforts in Africa in the 
context of broad debates about democracy promotion by emerging powers. [A2]The second section 
contextualises the analysis by reflecting on the sources of and constraints to South Africa’s democracy 
promotion. The third section highlights critical moments in the three administrations to reveal distinctive 
policy postures toward fostering democracy in Africa. We conclude with a reflection on possible future 
trends in light of the record of the past two decades. 
 
Democracy[A3] promotion in South Africa’s foreign policy 
After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC declared its commitment to the 
promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance in Africa for two reasons. First, the ANC 
had framed its political struggle against apartheid as a campaign against the suppression of human rights. 
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Writing on the eve of the elections, Mandela stated that the new South African government would ‘not 
be indifferent to the rights of others’, declaring that ‘human rights will be the light that guides our foreign 
affairs’ (Mandela 1993, 88). Mandela subsequently echoed these views at the UN General Assembly, 
where he urged ‘the empowerment of the ordinary people of our world freely to determine their destiny, 
unhindered by tyrants and dictators’ (Landsberg 2000, 107; Barber 2004). In a December 1994 foreign 
policy document, the ANC reiterated South Africa’s resolve to remain a vanguard of the global campaign 
against tyranny and discrimination because ‘just and lasting solutions to the problems of the world can 
only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide’ (ANC 1994[A4]). 
        Second, South Africa sought to promote democracy and human rights because these principles 
dovetailed with its foreign policy objectives to safeguard its security, stability and prosperity. The new 
South Africa tried to distinguish itself from the past by embracing a political culture that privileged 
diversity, tolerance, social justice and respect for human rights. For the new ANC leadership, nurturing 
and preserving these values was important to reinforce its emergence as a responsible international actor 
(Department of International Relations and Cooperation 2011, 10). In addition, the leadership saw 
democracy promotion as an important element in the restoration of stability and progress throughout 
Africa. As Mandela warned, South Africa ‘could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin’ to various 
parts of Africa without investing in Africa’s regeneration. Africa’s transformation (a policy that Thabo 
Mbeki later articulated as the African Renaissance), hinged on the lesson ‘that accountable government 
is good government’ (Mandela 1993, 88). After Mandela left power in 1999, Mbeki and Zuma continued 
to invoke the primacy of human rights and the advancement of democracy (Geldenhuys 2012, 32). 
        Despite these commitments, post-apartheid governments confronted problems in translating them 
into effective foreign policies. In 1997 the ANC acknowledged the difficulties involved in navigating the 
global scene on the basis of a principled and ethical foreign policy (ANC 1997). Among the key 
constraints were domestic pressures, a complex African regional environment and the challenge of 
navigating between the claims of liberal internationalism and Third World solidarity. 
 
Domestic constraints on foreign policy 
Addressing the historical legacies of inequities in the provision of basic needs and services to the majority 
of the population has been the most dominant factor in South Africa since 1994[A5]. As many analysts 
have pointed out, the ANC government inherited a weak economic and social base, characterized by 
gross inequalities (Alden and Le Pere 2009[A6], 145-169; Graham 2012, 405-203). Thus, successive 
administrations have focused on how economic diplomacy [A7]could contribute to the domestic needs of 
socioeconomic transformation.  Over the years, domestic expectations have also influenced South 
Africa’s aspirations to promote democracy and human rights abroad. South African policymakers have 
been faced with the dilemma of promoting commercial interests in a competitive world without 
conferring legitimacy to undemocratic states. For example, throughout Africa, South African companies 
have been accused of engaging in business activities that undermine the country’s diplomatic priorities 
(Alden and Soko 2005, 367-392).  
       Kagwanja (2009, 7-8) has identified two ideological camps that have competed to influence [A8]South 
Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. The first camp is what he calls ANC ‘liberation diplomats’ made 
up of idealists with strong pan-African and liberal impulses. Although quite small, this group was 
influential during the presidencies of Mandela and Mbeki. The second camp is made up of diverse groups 
that share the view that South Africa’s foreign policy should advance economic interests rather than 
grand political ideals. This group has emphasized the need to address widespread poverty and social 
exclusion instead of expending meagre resources on Africa’s regeneration. This view is shared by radical, 
socialist and populist [A9]elements in the ANC and also by the conservative segments in the business 
sector. As Marthoz observes, ‘the failure of successive ANC administrations to profoundly transform 
South Africa and uplift its black majority from poverty…[has contributed to reinforcing support for a] 
“realistic” and “pragmatist” foreign policy where economic necessity and developmental interests 
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inevitably trump idealistic values’ (2012, 3). As we argue below, the shift from a principled and ethical 
diplomacy to one defined more by domestic development concerns began during Mandela’s presidency 
and has become more pronounced in the current Zuma Administration. 
 
The complexity of the African environment  
Since 1994, successive administrations have prioritized Africa because of the view that Africa’s stability 
and development is central to South Africa’s economic development, national security and global 
ambitions (Sidiripolous and Hughes 2004, 61-62). Styled as the African Renaissance, this policy hinged 
partly on African commitments to democracy, human rights, and good governance (Habib 2009, 143-59; 
Geldenhuys 2012, 33). Under Zuma, the idea of the African agenda replaced the African Renaissance. 
The African agenda ‘seeks to promote peace and security on the continent, strengthen the pursuit of 
good governance and democracy, deepen regional integration, develop skills and build capacity within 
the organs of the [African Union], and advance Africa’s development agenda’ (Geldenhuys 2012, 33).  
        However, South Africa’s bid to transform the political landscape in Africa has faced numerous 
difficulties, particularly resistance from authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes. Cloaking themselves 
[A10]in the norms of sovereignty, non-interference and African solidarity, many African states have been 
reluctant to be lectured by South Africa, which they regard as the ‘new kid on the block[A11].’ Countries 
such as Angola, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have been apprehensive about Pretoria’s leadership role in Africa; 
moreover, these countries harbour their own aspirations for regional or continental leadership (Alden 
and Le Pere 2009, 145-169; Bischoff 2003, 183-201). South Africa’s ability to promote democracy in 
Africa has been equally circumscribed by the influence of external actors in Africa. For example, South 
Africa has often accused France of undermining its diplomacy in countries such as the Central African 
Republic (CAR) and Cote d’Ivoire. In addition, although offering new opportunities for development, 
the economic roles of new powers such as China and India inhibit South Africa’s policies in Africa[A12] 
(Kagwanja 2009, 28-29). 
 
Liberal internationalism versus Third World solidarity 
The contradictions surrounding the ANC as the ruling party of a modern democratic state, on the one 
hand, and a former liberation movement beholden to liberation ethos, on the other, have compromised 
South Africa’s efforts to promote democracy in Africa. In power, the ANC has exhibited a dual identity: 
invoking both the modernist values of liberalism and human rights and its global South orientation. The 
liberal internationalist tradition privileges democracy and human rights while the tradition of solidarity 
with the Third World is suspicious of any policy that undermines sovereignty and independence. Marthoz 
has captured this tension: ‘South Africa’s foreign policy doctrine reflects a complicated quest for identity 
after decades of wrenching apartheid policies and centuries of Western colonization, and expresses the 
tension between two major ingredients of the anti-apartheid struggle: democracy and human rights, on 
the one hand, and anti-imperialism and South-South solidarity, on the other’ (2012, 2). To demonstrate 
the significance of South-South cooperation in its foreign policy, South Africa acceded to the Chair of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) between 1998 and 2001 and acted as host of the September 1998 
NAM summit in Durban (Cooper 1998, 717). 
 
Mandela’s brief experiment with liberal idealism in Africa, 1994-1999 
Nelson Mandela’s presidency was defined primarily by the objective of reconstructing the identity of 
South Africa in the image of a liberal democracy. The democratic ideals of the new South African state 
paved the way for Mandela’s quest to influence the political behaviour of its African neighbours. 
However, these democratic impulses soon ran against the ANC’s Pan-African allegiances, strong 
resistance from African states and the proliferation of South African commercial and business interests 
in Africa. These competing pressures on policy, in turn, emboldened the pragmatic voices at the expense 
of moralistic positions on the promotion of democracy in Africa. According to Evans, under Mandela, 
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‘sharp divisions over the direction of foreign policy pitted pragmatists who sought to anchor South 
African policies closely to nationally-defined objectives against the ‘solidarists’ who sought an avowedly 
normative stance where justice, democracy, and human rights lay at the heart of policy’ (1996 263).  
        The reluctance by the ANC to distance itself from its liberation allies such as Cuba, Libya, Iran and 
North Korea severely compromised democracy promotion efforts. In southern Africa, Mandela faced 
resistance from Angola and Zimbabwe, which were averse to the values of inclusive politics that 
underpinned Mandela’s doctrine in Africa (Landsberg 2000, 109-111; Kraxberger and McClaughry 2013, 
15-16). South Africa’s refusal to join other Southern African Development Community (SADC) member 
states to send troops to the DRC to defend the besieged government of Laurent Kabila led Zimbabwe 
to complain about Pretoria’s domineering and arrogant attitude. As Barber asserts, Zimbabwe’s resistance 
to South Africa’s peaceful approach to stabilizing Africa stemmed partly from the fact that ‘Mugabe 
resented the star treatment given to Mandela, and at South Africa having ousted Zimbabwe as the leading 
regional state’ (2005, 1086).  
[A13]        In September 1998, alongside its SADC partners, Botswana and Zimbabwe, South Africa took 
the unprecedented decision to use armed force and demonstrate its power by intervening in Lesotho to 
restore democratic order following political skirmishes (Cooper 1998, 729; van Nieukerk 1999).        Since 
the mid-1990s, Lesotho had been convulsed by political instability occasioned by power contests between 
the military and civilians. The 1998 intervention yielded a quick military victory for South Africa and its 
partners. However, the victory was overshadowed by the fallout with other African leaders over South 
Africa’s policy toward Nigeria. In November 1996, South Africa unsuccessfully exerted diplomatic 
pressures on the government of General Sani Abachato to stop the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
eight other Ogoni leaders who had been agitating for human rights in the Niger Delta. Jolted by the 
execution, which occurred during the Commonwealth Heads of State summit in Auckland, New Zealand, 
Mandela led belated calls for Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth and the imposition of 
economic sanctions, only to find himself isolated by African states (Barber 2005, 1086; Evans 1996, 261; 
Cooper 1998, 711-712; Alden and Le Pere 2004, 289). Besides exposing the resistance of African leaders 
to South Africa’s human rights and democracy campaign, the Nigeria incident also highlighted the 
complexity of democracy promotion. Most African countries accused Mandela of being the West’s proxy 
by campaigning for Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth.  
        Apart from resistance from African leaders, Mandela faced economic constraints in his efforts to 
pursue human rights and democracy. For example, while advocating a negotiated solution to the conflict 
in the DRC, South Africa sold arms to Uganda and Rwanda, whose militaries were actively involved in 
the conflict. This worked to undermine Pretoria’s credibility as promoter of democracy in Africa (Le Pere 
6). Due to these constraints, South Africa made policy adjustments midway into Mandela’s presidency. 
Key among the ANC’s policy adjustments was the redefinition of human rights as a culturally-sensitive 
concept; although its promotion was not to be abandoned, the ANC felt that ‘rather than being supported 
as a separate “core concern”, “human rights” [should] be incorporated within “good government” and 
“democracy’” (Barber 2005, 1087). More importantly, South Africa sought to align democratic ideals 
more closely to the advancement of economic prosperity and political security, adjustments that were 
captured in the 1997 ANC policy document.  
 
Mbeki’s multilateral approach to democracy promotion in Africa, 1999-2008 
The pitfalls faced by Mandela in balancing the aspirations of fostering democracy and the projection of 
national interests influenced the Mbeki Administration as it crafted the African Renaissance. As deputy 
president, Mbeki had expressed strong opposition to one-party rule in Africa, suggesting that the present 
generation of African peoples ‘must resist all tyranny, oppose all attempts to deny liberty. . . In Africa, 
the people must govern’ (Landsberg 2000, 107). Various accounts of internal ANC debates in the early 
days of majority rule, however, have indicated that Mbeki was one of the leading sceptics of a policy 
based on the promotion of human rights and democracy (Vale 2010; Graham 2012, 417). According to 
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Gervisser, Mbeki argued that ‘while such high-minded principles might befit a liberation movement, they 
were entirely impractical for the government of an emerging power, struggling to re-enter the global 
economy’ (2007, 816). 
        These contradictions dominated Mbeki’s multilateral diplomacy which was inspired by reversing the 
plight of the continent (Cooper 1998, 173; Vale and Maseko 1998, 271-287; Habib 2009, 143-149; 
Bischoff 2003, 183-201). Galvanizing a multilateral effort that was spearheaded by[A14] Africa’s regional 
powers – Algeria, Nigeria and Senegal – Mbeki injected urgency in the ideas of the African Renaissance 
founded on four pillars: continental integration through the African Union (AU); political renewal 
through democracy and good governance; economic revival through the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD); and peacemaking initiatives to reverse the scourge of civil wars (Landsberg 
2010, 209-241; Bongmba 2004, 291-316). During the launch of the AU in Durban in 2002, Mbeki called 
on Africa to ‘proclaim to the world that it is a continent of democracy, a continent of democratic 
institutions and culture – indeed a continent of good governance where the people participate and the 
rule of law is upheld’ (Olivier 2003, 817-818). 
        The efforts at African integration dovetailed with a normative framework anchored on shared 
responsibilities, commitment to democratic principles and African ownership of African problems. 
Through the Constitutive Act of the AU, Mbeki and his colleagues sought to reinvigorate the principles 
of building democracy and accountable governance to signal the departure from old authoritarian 
practices. The momentum was further captured in the adoption of critical instruments, such as the 
African Charter for Democracy, Elections, and Good Governance; the AU Principles Guiding 
Democratic Elections in Africa; and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). In southern Africa, 
South Africa took the leadership role in positioning the SADC as a vehicle for economic integration and 
forging common values on democracy and human rights through the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections. Leadership through multilateralism reflected the realities of a South 
Africa that was beginning to understand the complex nature of African interstate relations and the limits 
to its leverage. As Alden and Le Pere contend, Mbeki’s ‘pan-African revivalism’ faced considerable 
constraints, particularly ambiguities over South Africa’s identity and scepticism among African partners 
about South Africa’s aspirations to continental leadership (2004, 283-284).  
        In playing a catalytic role to end conflicts in Africa, the Mbeki Administration focused on 
peacemaking in the Great Lakes region, notably Burundi and the DRC. Beginning in 1999, Mbeki 
encouraged high profile mediation of the Burundi conflict by Mandela and Zuma that led to various 
peace agreements among the Burundian factions. South Africa was also instrumental in initiatives that 
prepared the ground for a UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi that contributed to stability and national 
elections in 2006 (Landsberg 2006; Khadiagala 2013). Similar efforts marked Mbeki’s diplomacy in the 
DRC where South Africa worked with the UN and the AU to produce a series of peace agreements to 
end the war (Khadiagala 2009, 67-80). The elections of Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi and Joseph Kabila 
in the DRC were major contributors to building democracy through proactive peace-making and peace-
building, but they were among few successes in Mbeki’s foreign policy in Africa.    
        Democratic breakthroughs in the Great Lakes region belied the formidable dilemmas Mbeki 
confronted in using multilateral forums to advance democracy. With an elaborate set of principles on 
democracy and good governance, SADC seemed the ideal institution for South Africa’s democracy 
promotion, particularly because its economic weight potentially gave it more leverage in its regional 
neighbourhood. SADC, however, undercut [A15]South Africa’s leadership on strengthening democratic 
values.  As Alden and Le Pere have stated: 
 
Whereas concerns for democracy and human rights have been able to feature in the debate on 
foreign policy in the immediate post-apartheid period, recourse to SADC – despite its formal 
commitment to these issues – has tended to circumscribe substantive action in support of these 
values. This in turn has had a direct effect upon the selection of tools available to policymakers 
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in Pretoria, limiting them to public statements through SADC that emphasized organizational 
cohesion over expressions of concern or condemnation of actions by fellow member states (2004, 
289-290). 
 
Apart from alliance constraints, the enduring power of liberation ethos and the sense of obligation 
towards friends compromised regional pro-democracy efforts. Mbeki’s tolerance of undemocratic 
regimes in Angola and Swaziland revealed a reluctance to stand out in the face of defiance of regional 
norms on democratic governance. But the imbroglio surrounding Zimbabwe since the late 1990s best 
illustrates South Africa’s dithering on democracy promotion in the region (Adelmann 2004, 249-276; 
Moore 2010, 752-757; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). The emergence of the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) triggered a violent political backlash from the government of Robert Mugabe 
in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections in 2000 and to the presidential elections in 2002.  Violence 
was also meted out against white farmers following a spate of forcible seizure of land, resulting in 
international condemnation and Western-led economic sanctions. Amidst the deteriorating economic 
conditions, the Mbeki government provided Zimbabwe with an R1 billion economic rescue package and 
refused to join in the international condemnation; as Mbeki’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma remarked, ‘We are not going to be combative with Zimbabwe...We will exercise 
responsibility.  As long as the ANC is in power, Mugabe will never be condemned’ (Olivier 2003, 819). 
Despite political repression and electoral fraud in the presidential elections, the ANC gave unqualified 
endorsement to the South African election observer report that the elections had been ‘credible’ and 
‘legitimate’ (McKinley 2004, 360). 
        Throughout the mid-2000s, what became known disparagingly as Mbeki’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ on      
Zimbabwe was an attempt to nudge Mugabe to reduce internal repression while avoiding the international 
pressures for strong action (Hamill and Hoffman 2009, 1-12; Lipton 2009, 331-346). In refusing to 
publicly criticize Mugabe’s authoritarian practices, South Africa insisted that change would emanate from 
SADC’s diplomatic efforts that recognized Zimbabwe’s sovereignty.  But with no end in sight for the 
crisis, Mbeki agreed to lead SADC mediation in 2007 in anticipation of the 2008 elections. Although 
distrusted by the opposition for his leanings toward Mugabe’s government, Mbeki as a mediator carved 
a distinctive niche as the voice of SADC that sought to find political compromises that would benefit all 
parties before the 2008 elections. After the violently-contested election of March 2008, the MDC claimed 
it had been denied victory and boycotted the subsequent June 2008 presidential run-off. Mbeki renewed 
his diplomatic initiatives and encouraged the government and opposition to sign the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) in November 2008 that created the Government of National Unity (GNU). For the 
Mugabe government, the GPA and GNU were tactical compromises to gain time to re-organize after 
losing the March 2008 elections, prevent more Western economic sanctions and appease SADC, which 
was tired of the political impasse. The opposition, on the other hand, had no room for maneuver because 
its strength had dwindled in the face of organized repression.  To Mbeki, the GNU was a victory of sorts, 
not only in demonstrating regional resolve to ward off the overreaching hand of international actors 
interested in ‘regime change’ in Zimbabwe, but also in restoring stability that would allow the parties to 
negotiate new constitutional order (Moore 2010, 753; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). 
        Failure to take a strong and principled stance on Zimbabwe from the outset affected South Africa’s 
campaigns to embed democratic values in institutions across Africa. As Zimbabwe became the global 
barometer for South Africa’s inability to live up to the values of democratization, Mbeki took a defensive 
foreign policy posture, using every opportunity to condemn external criticisms as imperialist ploys for 
‘regime change[A16]’.  Furthermore, although South Africa had opted for multilateral stances in Africa to 
conceal its inability to promote unilateral pro-democracy objectives, Mbeki’s defensiveness against the 
West ended up compromising the very limited gains from such multilateralism. In the context of the 
standoff over Zimbabwe, it became difficult to sell credible democratic values to authoritarian and anti-
democratic regimes such as Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, despite the declaratory statements that emanated 
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from the AU. Equally important, the achievements of enshrining democratic norms in African 
continental institutions were nullified by the absence of clear South African leadership on ratification and 
domestication of these instruments. Although Mbeki’s supporters have claimed that he was merely a 
pioneer in the foundational stages of incorporation of democratic principles in continental institutions, 
South Africa missed a grand opportunity to use Mbeki’s stature to link the broad crusade on African 
Renaissance to the implementation of democratic norms. Despite sustained multilateralism, there were 
few converts to democratic governance and the rule of law at the end of the Mbeki era, signalling South 
Africa’s lack of effective means to translate its capabilities into hard and soft power[A17]. Although war 
had been brought to an end in countries like Burundi and the DRC, moving towards multiparty 
democracy remained a serious challenge. At the end of his term, Mbeki’s African policy was defined more 
by Zimbabwe than the other lofty goals that he had tried to articulate (Olivier 2012; Kraxberger and 
McClaughry 2013, 17). 
 
Zuma[A18] in Africa: muddling through democracy promotion, 2009-present 
The incremental shift from the normative principles in South Africa’s engagement with Africa that started 
with Mbeki has been sharpened in Zuma’s Africa policy. [A19]After the ouster of Mbeki from the ANC 
leadership in 2008, there were growing demands for more attention to domestic welfare than grandiose 
foreign policy schemes. Although it has resisted pressures for scaling down Mbeki’s policies, the Zuma 
administration has paid little attention to democratic values in foreign policy and has, in some instances, 
adopted more unilateral approaches to dealing with Africa. The draft 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s 
foreign policy reiterates the significance of a ‘united, peaceful, and prosperous’ Africa. But other than 
invoking the need to strengthen the APRM and discourage unconstitutional changes of government, it 
is silent on advancing democratic values (DIRCO 2011, 20-21; Thipayane 2011, 3-5; Landsberg 2012, 
75-102). The expectations that Mandela established in 1993 for a South Africa at the ‘forefront of global 
efforts to foster democratic systems of government’ have gradually disappeared from official policy 
discourses[A20]. This silence dovetails with the Zuma Administration’s inconsistent and wavering 
approaches to democracy and human rights promotion in Africa. Furthermore, some of Zuma’s actions, 
such as voting with the AU to condemn the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the vote to abolish 
the SADC Tribunal, have undercut the foundations laid by the previous administrations. Increasingly, 
these changes in foreign policy have coincided with growing fragmentation within the ANC governing 
alliance and the rise of new opposition parties.  
        One year into the Zuma presidency, South Africa’s response to the electoral conflict in Cote d’Ivoire 
signalled the start of unilateral and pragmatic initiatives that would unmask any pretence of an ethical 
[A21]policy towards Africa. Following the presidential elections in November 2010, a stalemate ensued 
between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara when Gbagbo refused to relinquish power. As the main 
interlocutor[A22] in the crisis, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a 
principled position from the outset, in line with its protocol on democracy and good governance, 
endorsing the position of the Ivorian electoral commission and UN observers that recognized Ouattara’s 
victory. South Africa’s response was less principled; Pretoria, joined by Angola and Uganda, questioned 
ECOWAS’ stance on the elections and hinted at a power-sharing arrangement as a possible solution to 
the crisis, a move that attracted the ire of both Nigeria and ECOWAS (Cook 2011, 34-37). Critics have 
pointed to South Africa’s position in the Ivorian electoral crisis as a reflection of the Zuma 
Administration’s preoccupation with preserving and consolidating strategic or historical alliances in 
Africa without regard for the potential political trade-offs, particularly in promoting democratic 
governance. Zuma’s perceived support for Gbagbo, a long-time West African ally of South Africa, has 
partly been attributed to the influence flowing from the rapprochement between Pretoria and Angola 
(Adebajo 2012). Since the relations with Angola hold immense economic benefits for South Africa, 
Pretoria has been reluctant to condemn the autocratic regime of President dos Santos (Roque 2009). 
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        South Africa’s responses to the political crises in Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) 
further underscored the fact that, like his predecessor, Zuma appears to have prioritised stability over 
democracy promotion in Africa. More importantly, they point to the growing impact of geopolitical 
considerations and fractured governmental machinery on the consistency of the country’s foreign policy. 
Seeking to avoid the initial unilateralism in Cote d’Ivoire, Zuma joined four other presidents in an AU 
High Level Ad-hoc Committee on Libya (AHCL) that was established in early March 2011 to mediate in 
the violent conflict between the government of Muammar Gaddafi and Benghazi-based rebels organized 
as the National Transitional Council (NTC). As part of the efforts to handle the Libyan crisis through an 
African-led initiative, the AHCL unveiled a roadmap on 10 March 2011, which advocated a negotiated 
solution to the crisis. However, on 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 
1973 authorising a no-fly zone over Libya, ostensibly to protect civilians, effectively overshadowing 
prospects for a negotiated settlement.  
        Alongside Gabon and Nigeria, South Africa voted for Resolution 1973, but soon repudiated it after 
NATO’s military intervention, which it considered to have overstepped the bounds of the resolution. 
Zuma’s back-pedalling on Libya raised questions about policy consistency, particularly with regard to 
Pretoria’s commitment to democratisation on the continent. South Africa squandered the opportunity 
provided by the Arab Spring to reassert its leadership on democracy promotion, particularly since Libya 
and most of North Africa for a long time had remained islands of authoritarianism in Africa. Instead, 
South Africa’s policy discourse was dominated by pouting [A23]over NATO’s ‘regime change.’ Zuma 
maintained that NATO and the UN had undermined African efforts, arguing that ‘the AU was not given 
space to implement its roadmap and to ensure an African solution to the Libyan question’ (Mail and 
Guardian, 14 June 2011). [A24]Even after Gaddafi’s demise, South Africa vigorously opposed UNSC 
efforts to unfreeze $1.5-billion in Libyan funds to assist with reconstruction. It only relented when the 
Council resolution omitted reference to the NTC.  Similarly, South Africa led efforts within the AHCL 
to deny recognition to the NTC on the claims that its rise to power had violated the AU’s doctrine of 
unconstitutional change of power. South Africa changed course in September 2011 after several African 
countries, including Nigeria, recognized the NTC.   
        The experiences in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya partly shaped South Africa’s single-minded pursuit of 
the position of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, now occupied by its candidate, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. Dlamini-Zuma’s election gave South Africa a new leadership role at the AU with 
promises to refocus on a policy that prevents inordinate Western interference in African affairs. In what 
seemed like a bid to regain some of its radical [A25]credentials that were lost in its support for the UNSC 
Resolution 1973 on Libya, South Africa couched the victory for the AU Chairperson position as an anti-
Western crusade.  In a briefing after the AU vote, the Minister for International Relations and 
Cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane, stated that South Africa had been very clear that ‘we want very good 
cordial relations with our co-operating partners, not based on colonial relations’.  The ANC Secretary-
General Gwede Mantashe was more explicit, noting that ‘we have shaken the AU because we have 
disorganised the French who always had a stronghold on the continent’ (SABC News, 1 February 2012). 
        South Africa’s intervention in the CAR that led to the death of fifteen soldiers in March 2013 further 
epitomized the perils of unilateralism that have dominated Zuma’s African forays. Critics have pointed 
out that with no strategic significance to South Africa, foreign policy toward the CAR has reflected two 
objectives that have dominated policy in Africa: first, the fixation with asserting South Africa’s political 
and economic muscle in Francophone Africa in an effort to check French influence; and second, the 
growing significance of ANC-linked commercial interests in countries with authoritarian regimes 
(Fabricius 2013). These objectives converged in a combustible context of civil conflicts in the CAR, 
which South Africa foreign policymakers have only started to fathom.  Like the previous precipitous 
actions in Cote d’Ivoire, the policy on the CAR has also called into question South Africa’s commitment 
to promoting democracy on the continent, including its ability to coordinate with regional actors. 
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        Zuma also inherited three political conflicts—Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Madagascar—that over the 
years have afforded South Africa space to exercise leadership in entrenching democratic governance in 
the SADC region. However, with the exception of Madagascar, South Africa’s leadership in these crises 
has produced few democratic outcomes. In Zimbabwe, South Africa and SADC were guarantors of the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA), including holding the Zimbabwean parties to their promises amidst 
continuing mistrust and acrimony. Under Zuma, SADC, with the exception of Botswana, continued to 
express reluctance to strongly criticize Mugabe to fully implement the terms of the GPA; instead SADC 
adopted what Ndlovu-Gatsheni has termed a ‘regionalized version of quiet diplomacy’ and led the 
crusade to end of Western-imposed sanctions (2011, 7). After steering the Zimbabwean parties through 
a three year constitution-making process, SADC unsuccessfully tried to convince Mugabe to postpone 
the elections scheduled for July 2013 to give more time for the preparation of a credible electoral roll and 
implement security sector reforms. The opposition parties made frantic appeals to SADC to prevail upon 
[A26]Mugabe because of the absence of conditions for holding free and fair elections. Mugabe, however, 
adroitly used the constitutional court to checkmate SADC and held the elections at the end of July 2013. 
During the standoff with SADC, relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe worsened when Mugabe 
called Zuma’s chief mediator Lindiwe Zulu, ‘some stupid, idiotic woman[A27]’.  In an attempt to mollify 
Mugabe, Zuma reprimanded Zulu for imposing her personal views on Zimbabwe and failing to operate 
within SADC procedures (Kotch 2013). In the elections that ended the five-year coalition government, 
Mugabe secured a landslide victory, against the backdrop of concerns about the voter’s roll, intimidation 
of voters and military interference in the poll. Zuma congratulated Mugabe for the ‘profound victory in 
the harmonized elections[A28]’. Botswana led a lone battle to challenge the electoral results by demanding 
an independent audit of the results, but it was silenced at a SADC summit in August 2013 in Malawi that 
endorsed the elections as ‘free, fair, and generally credible[A29]’. As one political analyst pointed out, 
SADC was quick to endorse the elections because it considers stability to be more important than 
democracy: ‘The region aspires for democracy. But where this threatens stability, they would rather go 
for stability’ (Makova 2013). 
        The same could be said of the Zuma Administration’s engagement in the DRC. In pursuit of what 
Landsberg has described as a ‘utilitarian foreign policy’ (2010, 263), South Africa has resorted to the 
promotion of low-intensity [A30]democracy in this conflict-ridden but economically strategic SADC 
member state. Under Zuma, South Africa’s support for the faltering democratization process in the DRC 
has been glaringly reduced to securing a stable environment and a friendly government in Kinshasa, 
arguably to advance its economic and other strategic interests. This is evident, for instance, in Pretoria’s 
endorsement of the flawed general elections of 2011, which controversially returned President Kabila to 
power. Zuma and Angola’s dos Santos have positioned themselves as Kabila’s major regional backers, 
an alliance that appears to have given Kinshasa a lifeline to restore a sense of stability in the restive eastern 
DRC, but which could equally prove to be an impediment to the DRC’s democratisation process. In 
February 2013, a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region was signed in 
Addis Ababa by eleven concerned states and intergovernmental organizations. The framework came with 
two major responsibilities, one specific to the DRC government to reform state institutions and deepen 
democracy and another for the entire region to address the insecurity across the DRC’s borders. With 
regard to the latter, South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, working through SADC, were instrumental in 
securing the deployment by the UN of a special peace enforcement unit, the Force Intervention Brigade 
(FIB), which within a relatively short period of time was successful in altering the military dynamics in 
Eastern DRC. The relative stability in Eastern DRC brought by regional military support has, however, 
not been accompanied by a corresponding diplomatic effort to pressure Kabila to undertake political and 
governance reforms. 
        Since 2009, South Africa and SADC have also been engaged in mediation of the constitutional crisis 
in Madagascar that resulted from the ouster of elected President Marc Ravalomanana by Andry Rajoelina 
in March 2009. Soon after Rajoelina took power and constituted a High Transitional Authority (HTA) 
10  
government, SADC and the AU suspended Madagascar in line with the provisions on unconstitutional 
change in government. As political tensions led to widespread violence, SADC appointed Joaquim 
Chissano, former Mozambican president, to lead a Joint Mediation Team comprising the UN, the AU 
and the International Organization of the Francophonie (IOF). The core objective of the negotiations 
was to launch an inclusive dialogue aimed at creating a political environment for the return to 
constitutional normalcy (Ancas 2011; Zounmenou 2009, 72-75). After relentless diplomatic engagements, 
SADC mediators announced a Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar in September 2011, which 
proposed a transitional government that would establish a new electoral framework leading to democratic 
elections. By January 2012, the parties had implemented provisions of the roadmap, including the 
appointment of a new prime minister, cabinet, legislature and electoral commission, but persistent 
differences forced additional SADC mediation. In July 2012 talks in Seychelles mediated by Zuma, 
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina led to an agreement to prepare for elections that would exclude all the 
former leaders of Madagascar; this decision was later reaffirmed by the electoral court, paving the way 
for the elections in October 2013 (Deville 2013). The election of Hery Rajaonarimampianina as president 
after a December 2013 run-off poll, including the endorsement of the outcome by international 
observers, lent some credence to SADC’s (and South Africa’s) efforts to promote democracy in the 
region. Madagascar would also perhaps be judged as the only ray of light in South Africa’s leadership of 
pro-democracy at the regional level, after the disappointing policies toward Zimbabwe, the DRC and 
Swaziland.  
        At the continental level, the Zuma Administration has reversed the fight against impunity by joining 
in condemnations against the ICC. The tensions between the AU and ICC started in July 2009 at an AU 
Summit in Libya when the AU opted not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of indicted Sudanese 
President Omar Al-Bashir. At the AU summit in Ethiopia in January 2011, the AU escalated the anti-
ICC war by siding with the decision of Chad and Kenya not to arrest Al-Bashir for the sake of regional 
‘peace and security’ (AU 2011). At the same meeting, the AU supported Kenya’s request to the UN 
Security Council for the deferral of the ICC’s investigation and prosecutions in relation to the 2008 post-
election violence in which the current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and deputy president, William Ruto, 
have been indicted. In contesting the legitimacy of the ICC, the AU has continually invoked the need to 
support African efforts at peace and reconciliation, even though there are only tentative steps on the 
continent to create credible legal mechanisms for accountability and the fight against impunity.  Matters 
came to a head at the May 2013 summit in Ethiopia where the AU (with the exception of Botswana) 
voted unanimously to refer the Kenya cases back to Kenya to allow the establishment of a ‘national 
mechanism to investigate and prosecute the cases under a reformed Judiciary provided for in the new 
constitutional dispensation, in support of the on-going peace building and national reconciliation 
processes, in order to prevent the resumption of conflict and violence in Kenya’ (AU 2013). 
        Although South Africa has domesticated the Rome Statute that created the ICC, the Zuma 
Administration has remained silent in the face of the onslaught of opposition toward the Court.  
[A31]South African officials have claimed that this posture does not denote a departure from the tenets 
of international criminal justice and that decisions at the AU are reached through sufficient consensus 
(Thipanyane 2011, 3-4). Nonetheless, the vote in May 2013 was an abdication of its leadership in Africa 
because it amounted to appeasing the anti-ICC block at the AU at the expense of commitment to 
international norms. South Africa’s international standing was further compromised when it backed the 
AU’s October 2013 decision calling for sitting African heads of state to be exempted from prosecution 
and requested the UN Security Council to defer the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto (Xinhua 2013). Previously, 
South Africa’s commitment to international human rights norms had been put into question in May 2011 
when it joined its regional partners to abolish the SADC Tribunal[A32]. In 1992, the treaty that created 
SADC made provisions for a SADC Tribunal as an integral part of the organization.  The Tribunal was 
formally inaugurated in November 2005 and heard its first major case in 2008 when a white Zimbabwean 
farmer lodged a complaint against the Mugabe government for land dispossession. The Tribunal ruled 
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that the Zimbabwe government had violated the human rights provisions of the SADC treaty in using 
race as the basis of land dispossession. When the Zimbabwean government twice refused to adhere to 
the ruling, the Tribunal referred the matter to the SADC summit for ‘appropriate action’. With 
Zimbabwe’s rejection of the ruling, SADC appointed an independent expert to review the role, 
responsibilities, and terms of reference of the Tribunal. In May 2011, SADC ignored the 
recommendations of the expert, which reiterated that the Tribunal was lawfully constituted and its 
decisions would be binding to signatories. In effect, SADC sided with the Zimbabwean government in 
rejecting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and demanded a revision of its mandate. At the SADC Summit 
in September 2012, leaders approved the decision to dissolve the SADC Tribunal, an action decried by 
human rights advocates (Matyszak 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to contribute to debates about the promotion of democracy by emerging powers. 
It has revealed that, for emerging powers, democracy promotion is an expensive enterprise which, 
because of competing priorities, they can barely afford.  [A33]Often they are torn between the liberal 
internationalist conviction that democratization fosters peaceful and stable neighbourhoods and the 
Third World mind-set against intervention and respect for sovereignty. As they straddle these contrasting 
postures, emerging powers frequently settle for the comfort of leadership by example rather than by 
prescription: they would prefer more countries in their neighbourhoods to subscribe to democratic tenets 
and practices, but they do not devote any significant resources and energies in contributing to democratic 
outcomes. They proclaim fealty to democratic values but are defensive when outsiders prescribe these 
values to their undemocratic allies and neighbours. South Africa’s vacillation on democracy promotion 
in Africa is thus typical of the obstacles emerging powers face in reconciling these contradictory trends.   
        Over the past two decades, South Africa has gradually learned to mobilize its population toward 
foreign policy objectives that remain contested. [A34]Years of insularity and isolation created a wide gulf 
between the domestic and international arenas, yielding widespread scepticism about external 
entanglements, particularly in Africa. Democracy promotion, like other foreign policy objectives, hinges 
on a measure of domestic consensus about roles, responsibilities and resources. In the same vein, given 
the competitive nature of priorities, policymakers often have to make trade-offs around a whole array of 
foreign policies. The death of Mandela in December 2013 has strengthened the posture dominant since 
the early 2000s of the priority of pragmatic national interests over promotion of democracy and human 
rights in Africa. [A35]Pressures to maximize intrinsic national interests have compromised democratic 
ethos in an African environment where these values have not found steady footing. While there are many 
more democracies in Africa than in previous years, South Africa has only played a perfunctory role in the 
propagation and advocacy of democratization on the continent. The Mbeki Administration made 
significant strides in the construction of African institutions that sought to underpin the shared values of 
democratic governance, human rights observation, and the rule of law. Providing leadership on these 
issues was important, but more could have been done by Mbeki and the Zuma Administration to 
popularize the entrenchment of these values across Africa, despite the difficulties of navigating the terrain 
of Africa’s interstate relations. At a minimum, the Zuma government needed a firm determination to 
reinforce these values rather than presiding over their demise.  
        As an emerging power South Africa is dependent on multilateral institutions to effect change, but 
this has come at a heavy price on democracy promotion. Multilateralism helps to overcome weaknesses 
embedded in emerging power status, but it subjects foreign policy to the vagaries[A36] of decisions made 
by others. Finding a balance between unilateralism and multilateralism has been the biggest obstacle in 
South Africa’s pro-democracy efforts in Africa.  Moreover, as the diplomacy around the ICC reveals, 
having sponsored its candidate to Chair the AU, South Africa is now held hostage to the multilateral 
decisions emanating from Addis Ababa, decisions that may invariably compromise and diminish national 
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values. [A37]Ultimately, therefore, democracy promotion abroad is, at its heart, an outcome of adherence 
to solid democratic norms and practices at home.   
        Following the May presidential 2014 elections, Zuma and the ANC won with a reduced majority in 
parliament partly because of the growth of opposition groups disenchanted with Zuma’s domestic 
policies. Since his re-election, Zuma has hardly reversed the policies that pay little attention to the 
principles of democracy and human rights promotion in Africa. In fact, in the context of growing 
dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic performance of the ANC and Zuma’s entanglement in publicised 
corruption scandals, voices that have agitated for a more inward-looking and economic-oriented 
diplomacy continue to prevail. Moreover, given the fierce geopolitical and economic challenges that 
South Africa faces in Africa from Western powers and other emerging powers, it is likely that Pretoria 
will become far less inclined in the future to pursue democracy and human rights in its foreign policy.  
 
Notes on contributors[A38] 
 
 
 
References 
Adebajo, Adekeye (2012) ‘South Africa and Angola: Southern Africa’s Pragmatic Hegemons’, Regional 
Integration Observer, 6:1 
Adelmann, Martin (2004) ‘Quiet Diplomacy: The Reasons behind Mbeki’s Zimbabwe Policy’, Afrika 
Spectrum, 39:2, 249-276 
African National Congress (1994) ‘Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa’,  
Johannesburg: African National Congress 
African National Congress (1997) ‘Developing a strategic objective on South African foreign policy’, 
Johannesburg: African National Congress 
Alden, Chris and Garth le Pere (2004) ‘South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From 
Reconciliation to Ambiguity?’Review of African Political Economy, 31:100, 283-297 
Alden, Chris and M. Soko (2005) ‘South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and its 
Discontents’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43: 3, 367-392 
Ancas, Sarah (2011) ‘The Effectiveness of Regional Peace-making in Southern Africa: Problematizing 
the United Nations-African Union-Southern African Development Community 
Relationship’, African Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11: 1, 129-152  
African Union (2011) ‘Decisions, Declaration and Resolution of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the Union’, Addis Ababa: AU Commission, January 30-31 
African Union (2013) Decisions, Declaration and Resolution of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the Union, Addis Ababa: AU Commission, May 26-27 
Barber, James (2004) Mandela’s World: The International Dimensions of South Africa’s Political Revolution, 1990-
1999 (London: James Currey) 
Barber, James (2005) ‘The new South Africa’s foreign policy: Principles and practice’, International 
Affairs, 81: 5, 1086 
Bischoff, Paul-Henri (2003) ‘External and Domestic Source of Foreign Policy Ambiguity: South African 
Foreign Policy and the Projection of Pluralist Middle Power’, Politikon, 30: 2, 183-201 
Bongmba, Elias K (2004) ‘Reflections on Mbeki’s African Renaissance’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
30:2, 291-316 
Burnell, Peter (2004) ‘Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies’, International Politics 
and Society, 3, 100-116 
Burnell, Peter (2008) ‘International Democracy Promotion: A Role for Public Goods 
Theory?’Contemporary Politics, 14, 1, 37-52 
Burnell, Peter and Peter Calvert (2005) “Promoting Democracy Abroad,” Democratization, 12, 4, 433-438 
13 
Carothers, Thomas (1999) Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace[A39] 
Cartwright, Jan (2009) ‘India’s Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?’ 
Asian Survey, 49, 3, 403-428[A40] 
Cederman, Lars-Erik (2001) ‘Back to Kant: Re-Interpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macro-Historical 
Learning Process’, American Political Science Review, 95, 1, 15-32[A41] 
Cook, Nicholas (2011) ‘Cote d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis’, Congressional Research Service Report 7-
570, Washington DC, 28 January 
Cohen, Raymond (1994) ‘Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that ‘Democracies do not go to 
War with each Other’, Review of International Studies, 20, 3, 207-223[A42] 
Cooper, Andrew F (1998) ‘The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy’, International Journal, 53: 
4, 705-732 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)(2011)Building a Better World: The 
Diplomacy of Ubuntu, White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, Pretoria.  
Deville, Eric (2013) ‘Madagascar’s Presidential Election in Doubt’, Digital Forum, June 28. 
<http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/353293[A43]> 
Diamond, Larry (1999) Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives. New 
York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
Evans, Graham (1996) ‘South African Policy in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 34: 2, 249-269 
Fabricius, Peter (2013) ‘Is SA now Big Brother in Africa?’ The Star, 26 April 
Geldenhuys, Deon (2012) ‘Political culture in South African Foreign Policy’, International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, 2:18, 29-38 
Gervisser, M (2007) Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball) 
Goldsmith, Arthur (2008) ‘Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning the Premises of 
Democracy Promotion’, International Security, 33, 2, 120-147 [A44] 
Graham, Matthew (2012) ‘Foreign Policy in Transition: The ANC’s Search for a Foreign Policy Direction 
during South Africa’s Transition, 1990-1994’, The Round Table, 1010:5, 405-423 
Habib, Adam (2009) ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Hegemonic Aspirations, Neoliberal Orientations, 
and Global Transformations’, South African Journal of International Relations, 16: 2, 143-159  
Hamill, J and J Hoffman[A45](2009) ‘“Quiet Diplomacy” or Appeasement? South African Policy toward 
Zimbabwe’ Round Table, 98: 402, 1-12  
Hobson, Christopher (2009)  ‘The Limits of Liberal-Democracy Promotion’, Alternatives, 34, 4, 383-405 
Kagwanja, Peter (2009) An encumbered regional power? The capacity gap in South Africa’s peace diplomacy in Africa 
(Cape Town: Human Science Research Council)  
[A46]Kartas, Moncef (2007) ‘Post-conflict Peacebuilding – Is the Hegemony of the “Good Governance” 
Discourse Depoliticising the Local?’ Paper presented at the annual conference of the 
Nordic International Studies Association (NISA), Odense, May 24-25[A47] 
Khadiagala, Gilbert M (2009) ‘South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC)’in Kurt Shillinger (ed) Africa’s Peacemakers? Lessons from South Africa’s 
Conflict Mediation (Auckland Park: Jacana Media) 
Khadiagala, Gilbert M (2013) ‘Burundi’ in Jane Boulden (ed) The United Nations and Regional Organizations 
in Africa (New York: Palgrave) 
Kotch, Nicholas (2013) ‘Zuma Cracks the Whip after Mugabe Telephone Call’ Business Day, 22 July 
Kraxberger, Brennan and Paul McClaughry (2013) ‘South Africa in Africa: A Geopolitical Perspective’ 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 47: 1, 9-25 
Landsberg, Chris(2000)‘Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine’, Journal of Democracy, 11:3, 
107-121 
14  
Landsberg, Chris (2006) ‘South Africa’ in Gilbert M Khadiagala(ed) Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes 
Region (Boulder: Lynne Rienner) 
Landsberg, Chris (2010) ‘Thabo Mbeki’s Legacy of Transformational Diplomacy’ in Daryl Glaser (ed) 
Mbeki and after: Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki (Johannesburg: Wits University Press) 
Landsberg, Chris (2012) ‘The Jacob Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy: Association or Dissociation?’ 
Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relation 1: 1, 75-102 
Le Pere, Garth (not dated) ‘South Africa’s foreign policy in a globalising world: An overview: 1994-2002’, 
Report prepared for the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services in the Presidency as 
part of a 10 year review 
Lipton, Merle (2009) ‘Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of 
Zimbabwe’South African Journal of International Affairs, 16: 3, 331-346 
Mail and Guardian (2011) ‘Zuma lashes at NATO for “Abusing” UN Resolutions on Libya’, 14 June 
2011<http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-14-zuma-lashes-nato-for-abusing-un-resolutions-
on-libya>, accessed on March 5, 2014[A48] 
Makova, Patrice (2013) ‘Zimbabwe: ‘AU, SADC Endorsed Election to Protect Reputation’ The Standard, 
11 August[A49] 
Mandela, Nelson (1993) ‘South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy’,Foreign Affairs, 72: 5, 86-94 
Marthoz, Jean-Paul (2012) ‘The challenges and ambiguities of South Africa’s foreign policy’,       
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Report      
Matyszak, Derek (2012) The Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal (Johannesburg: Research and Advocacy Unit) 
McKinley, Dale (2004) ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki’, Review of African 
Political Economy, 31: 100, 357-364 
Moore, David (2010) ‘A Decade of Disquieting Diplomacy: South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the Ideology 
of the National Democratic Revolution, 1999-2009’, History Compass, 8:8, 752-67 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J (2011) Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC 
Mediation in Zimbabwe, Policy Brief 94, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs) 
Olivier, Gerrit (2003) ‘Is Mbeki Africa’s Saviour?’, International Affairs,79b: 3, 815-828 
Olivier, Gerrit (2012)‘Zuma’s Modest Aims better than Mbeki’s Lofty Goals’ Business Day, 6 August, 
<http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2009/05/14/zuma-s-modest-aims-better-than-
mbeki-s-lofty-goals>[A50] 
Roque, Paula (2009) ‘South Africa – Angola: A New Era of Hegemonic Cooperation or a Dangerous 
Precedence for Africa?’ISS Today, 25 August  
Saward, Michael (1994) ‘Democratic theory and indices of democratization’ in David Beetham(ed) 
Defining and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage)[A51] 
Schoeman, Maxi (2003) ‘South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power, 1994-2003’in State of the Nation: 
South Africa, 2003-2004(Cape Town: HSRC Press)[A52] 
Schweller, Randall (2000) ‘US Democracy promotion: Realist reflections’ in Michael Cox and 
others[A53](eds) American democracy promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press)[A54] 
Sidiripolous, Elizabeth and Tim Hughes (2004) ‘Between democratic governance and sovereignty: The 
challenge of South Africa’s Africa policy’ in Elizabeth Sidiripolous (ed) South Africa’s foreign 
policy 1994-2004: Apartheid past, renaissance future(Johannesburg: SAIIA).                    
Smith, Steve (2000) ‘US Democracy promotion: Critical Questions’ in Michael Cox and others, 
[A55](eds)American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC News) ‘Don’t Write off Dlamini-Zuma for AU Post—
Mantashe’ 
15 
(2012)<http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/2b1ecd004a024c9fa3e1afcd44c232d0/Dont-
write-off-Dlamini-Zuma-for-AU-post:-Mantashe-20120201>, accessed March 5, 2014 
Stuenkel, Oliver (2013), “Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion: The Case of Brazil 
and India,” Third World Quarterly, 34, 2, 335-355[A56] 
Thipanyane, Tseliso (2011) South Africa’s Foreign Policy under the Zuma Government, Policy Brief 64, 
December, Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa 
Vale, Peter (2010) ‘Thabo Mbeki and the Great Foreign Policy Riddle’ in Daryl Glaser(ed) Mbeki and after: 
Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki (Johannesburg: Wits University Press) 
Vale, Peter and Sipho Maseko (1998) ‘South Africa and the African Renaissance’, International Affairs,74: 
2, 271-287 
Van Nieukerk, Anthoni (1999) ‘Implications for South Africa’s Foreign Policy beyond the Lesotho 
Crisis’, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts, Working Paper no. 3 
Wolff, Jonas and Iris Wurm (2011) ‘Towards a theory of external democracy promotion: A proposal for 
theoretical classification’, Security Dialogue 42: 1,77-96  [A57] 
Xinhua (2013) ‘South Africa backs AU decision on ICC: Zuma’, Xinhua News, 14 October 
Youngs, Richard (2011) ‘Misunderstanding the Maladies of Liberal Democracy’, FRIDE Working Paper 
106[A58] 
Zounmenou, David (2009) ‘Madagascar’s Political Crisis: What Options for the Mediation 
Process?’African Security Review, 18: 4, 71-75 
 
 
 
 
